The octopus does not communicate with faint mouth sounds, although water is a good medium for acoustic signaling. Octopus, rather, it becomes its own linguistic sense. Octopuses have a huge repertoire of color changes, all sorts of specks, stains and stripes moving along their surface. This repertoire in combination with the soft-bodied physics of a given being allows it to hide and reveal its linguistic intention, its linguistic meaning, simply by quickly folding and unfolding changing parts of the body. The mind and body of the octopus are one, and therefore equally visible; the octopus wears its tongue like a second skin. Octopuses can hardly communicate. Their use of ink sprays for concealment probably indicates that this is the only possible way for them to have something like their own, private thought.The ink bubble can be a kind of corrective fluid for a clean octopus, showing that he made a false statement. Martin Moinighem wrote about the complexity of cephalopod mollusc communication.
Communication and communication systems in cephalopod mollusks are mainly visual. They include the location of pigment cells, posture and movement. Poses and movements can be ritualized or non-ritualized. Changes of color, apparently, are always ritualized. Different drawings, patterns can be connected in many and often complex ways. They can be replaced very quickly. Since they are visual, they are relatively easy to describe and decipher to a human observer. But there are difficulties.
Readable or unreadable, whether it is true or not, but these patterns-folds of cephalopods, like all other animals, encode information. Since this is a message, whether intentional or not, they seem to have not only syntax, but also simple grammar.
Like octopuses, our purpose is to become what we think, so that our thoughts become our body, and our bodies – thoughts. This is the essence of the more perfect Logos, which the encyclopaedist-Hellenistic forester Philo of Judaia foresaw, the Logos, in whom the Goddess abides, not heard, but visible. Hans Jonas explains the idea of Philo of Judea as follows.
A more sophisticated archetypal logos, free from the human duality of the sign and thing, and therefore not associated with forms of speech, would not require the mediation of hearing, but is directly seen by the mind as the truth of things. In other words, the antithesis of vision and hearing, put forward by Philo, lies generally in the realm of “vision,” that is, it is not a real antithesis, but a difference in degree relative to the ideal of the direct intuitive presence of the object. From the point of view of this ideal, “hearing” here, opposed to “vision,” is understood precisely as representing its conventional form, and not as something genuine, different in its essence than vision. Accordingly, the turn from hearing to vision provided here is a transition from knowing the limited to knowing adequately of the same plan.